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ARTICLES
THE INTERCIVILIZATIONAL INEQUITIES OF
NUCLEAR POWER WEIGHED AGAINST THE
INTERGENERATIONAL INEQUITIES OF
CARBON BASED ENERGY
Karl S. Coplan·
Sometime toward the end of the industrial revolution, western in-
dustrial countries discovered a new way to power their steam en-
gines, which had previously been powered by burning wood and
coal. This energy source promised to power the machines of civili-
zation and progress far into the future. This energy source seemed at
the time to be cheap and limitless, and contained an energy density
(energy potential per unit weight) far exceeding those of fuels previ-
ously used to power steam engines. 1 Unfortunately for the genera-
tions that would follow, the early proponents of this energy source
simply ignored the waste by-product of this fuel cycle. The wastes
produced by this fuel will likely, at a minimum, render currently
populated places in the world uninhabitable, and, at worst, threaten
the survival of the human species. 'DIese impacts will affect genera-
tions far into the future.
Although this paragraph could well describe the climate impacts of
burning fossil fuels, I am not talking about the carbon cycle and
global warming. I am talking about the impacts of nuclear energy
production. Proponents of nuclear energy tout the energy source as
the most promising offset to greenhouse gases produced in electric-
ity generation. These proponents eagerly await the additional direct
and indirect subsidies for new nuclear power plants that would flow
from various carbon tax and emissions trading schemes. Carbon
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
I. The energy density of uranium is 560,000 gigajoules per tonne, compared
to 27 gigajoules for coal, and 40 gigajoules for fuel oil. lOR Energy Pty Ltd, En-
gineering Conversion Factors, http://astron.berkeley.edu/-wright/fuel_energy.htrnl
(last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
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emissions trading and offset schemes will subsidize the nuclear en-
ergy industry indirectly, by making competing fossil fuel based en-
ergy more expensive, and by potentially offering marketable offset
credits for new nuclear energy generation projects that displace ex-
isting carbon-based energy generation.
This essay explains that such encouragement of nuclear energy
production as a "solution" to fossil fuel-induced climate change will
create environmental problems equally as grave as' those posed by a
carbon-based energy economy. Both nuclear energy and fossil en-
ergy impose enormous environmental externalities that are not cap-
tured by the economics of energy production and distribution. While
emissions trading schemes seek to harness market-based efficiencies
to accomplish pre-determined reductions, they neither seek to nor
succeed in capturing the environmental externalities of energy gen-
eration. By creating a set of incentives without capturing all of the
externalities, these trading schemes will simply distort the market,
possibly leading to a worse overall damage to the environment than
global warming by itself.
Ultimately, nuclear power production as an alternative to carbon-
based energy production simply presents a choice of evils. Efforts to
reduce carbon emissions must not come at the expense of distorting
energy markets in a way that exacerbates the equally insurmountable
problems posed by the multi-millennial storage of hazardous nuclear
waste.
I. CARBON TRADING SCHEMES, ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES,
AND NUCLEAR POWER
A. Regulation ofEnvironmental Externalities
The body of environmental law has often been characterized as a
necessary response to the failure of free markets to capture environ-
mental externalities. 2 In the paradigmatic "Tragedy of the Com-
mons,,,3 it is the free market for wool and mutton that lead unre-
strained sheepherders to overgraze the common fields in order to
. 2. See, e.g., ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAW AND POLICY 53-55 (4th ed. 2003); FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY,
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 41-43 (2000).
3. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
(excerpted in GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 47-50).
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increase their short tenn profits, at the cost of destruction of the very
resource necessary for their livelihood. The environmental "cost" of
damage to the grazing field is considered an "externality," as the
shepherds do not pay for use of the field, and thus have no market
incentives to reduce that use. Unfortunately, the global carbon-
based energy economy is a frightening example of the tragedy of the
commons, as energy producers rapidly consume an essential global
resource, the carbon absorbing capacity of the global ecosystem,
without having to pay for it.
Traditional environmental regulation responds to the tragedy of the
commons by imposing enforceable limits on the rate of use of the
common resource. These limits may be based on an assessment of
the assimilative capacity of the environmental resource, such as wa-
ter quality based limits under the Clean Water Act,4 or on available
technologies to reduce the units of environmental hann per units of
economic goods, such as technology based limitations.5 These regu-
lations internalize the environmental costs of production to the ex-
tent that the producer must now pay the costs of avoiding environ-
mental hann as necessary to meet regulatory standards. These regu-
lations do not completely internalize environmental costs to the ex-
tent that the producers continue to impose environmental impacts
below the regulatory threshold at no cost. If the regulatory threshold
is set at a level that still causes hanns to the environmental com-
mons, these costs are still "external" to the market.
B. Market Efficiencies and Trading Schemes
Emissions trading programs seek to import market efficiencies into
the regulatory scheme.6 Instead of requiring all producers to reduce
environmental emissions equally, those who can reduce their pollu-
tion more efficiently are allowed to sell their excess "pollution
rights" to those producers who would have to pay more to achieve
the same reduction. When functional, an emissions trading scheme
4. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C §§ 301(b)(l)(C), 302, 303(d) (2002); 33
U.S.c. §§ 1311(b)(l)(C), 1312, 1313(d) (2002).
5. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.c. § 301(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)
(2002). See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Economic Dynamics of Environ-
mental Law And The Static Efficiency: The Goals of Environmental Legislation,
31 RC. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 529 (2004).
6. See generally, Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard R Stewart, Reforming Envi-
ronmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
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uses market efficiencies to achieve the same decrease in environ-
mental impact at a lower overall societal cost. 7
Such a trading scheme does not, however, internalize the environ-
mental externalities to any greater extent than the underlying regula-
tory limits. The money collected in the sale of tradable emissions
rights does not necessarily go to remedying the environmental prob-
lems caused by the emissions permitted.8 Worse still, if the pollu-
tion rights are sold by government with proceeds going to general
revenue rather than complete mitigation of the environmental harm,
government becomes a partner in the polluting enterprise and has an
interest in continuing the environmental pollution to maintain the
revenue stream. 9 Such trading schemes have also been criticized for
discouraging technological innovation by rewarding the dischargers
that can make the easiest, short term reductions and allowing the
dischargers with more technologically challenging reductions to buy
their way out of emissions control at the lower cost. 10
The most successful environmental trading scheme to date has
been the "cap and trade" scheme established for sulfur oxide emis-
sions that cause acid rain. II This trading scheme established a cap
on acid rain emissions designed to achieve an overall reduction in
emissions. 12 The market for the tradable credits stabilized at a cost
per ton far below the initial industry estimates of costs to comply,
indicating either that the market efficiencies were effective in reduc-
ing compliance costs, or that industry vastly overstated the costs of
compliance while fighting the regulations. 13
Sulfur trading works environmentally as well as economically be-
cause the pollutant impacts in question are regional, so reductions at
7. Id at 176-177 & passim.
8. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 76510 (c)(6) (2000) (providing that proceeds of auctioned
sulfur emissions allowances under the Clean Air Act be returned, pro rata, to the
regulated sulfur emissions sources).
9. This situation is similar to the awkward position of the states in the to-
bacco litigation settlement, which came to depend on the revenue stream generated
by tobacco sales. See Myron Levin, States' Tobacco Settlement Has Failed to
Clear the Air, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9,2003, at Cl.
10. David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading
Idea And The Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. I (1998).
11. See Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is
There a Place for Pollutant Trading?, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 153-163
(1998).
12. Clean Air Act 403,42 U.S.c. 7651b (1995); see generally Powers, supra
note 11, at 156-162.
13. See Powers, supra note 11, at 158-159.
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one source can properly offset emissions at another source that may
be hundreds of miles away.14 The sulfur trading system is simple
and direct: an existing emitter must reduce its permitted discharge by
one ton in order to have a one-ton credit to sell to another emitter
that would otherwise exceed its limit. 15 No one earns credits by "se-
questering" sulfur dioxide, or adding lime to the eastern lakes af-
fected by acid rain. 16
C. Carbon Trading Schemes: The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative
Like sulfur trading, greenhouse gas reductions also are susceptible
to cap and trade emissions control systems. 17 Greenhouse gas im-
pacts are global, not local or regional, so trading between regions
and even continents has environmental benefits. 18 Carbon trading
schemes such as the one envisioned by the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI),19 however, take the market incentives of the sul-
fur trading schemes a step further. Not only do they allow the crea-
tion of tradable credits by existing carbon generators who use new
technology to reduce the carbon dioxide emissions while generating
the same amount of power, but they also allow tradable credits to be
generated by those who engage in projects to sequester carbon diox-
ide (such as reforestation projects) and by those who reduce emis-
14. See Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990,21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1753 (1991).
15. See 42 U.S.c. § 7651b; 7651a(3) (2006) (defining allowance to mean the
right to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide).
16. See 42 USC 7651c(t) (2006) (providing for allowances for renewable en-
ergy and conservation, but not for sulfur dioxide sequestration or mitigation meas-
ures).
17. See generally, Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading, 17 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 267 (2004).
18. Carbon dioxide emissions are diffused throughout the atmosphere, so
emissions reductions are equally valuable wherever they take place. See COMM.
ON THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE
CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEy QUESTIONS, 1-5 (2001), available
at http://books.nap.edulhtml/climatechange/climatechange.pdf. (discussing global
nature ofanthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions).
19. For information about the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, see gener-
ally Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org (last visited January
14,2007).
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sions of non-energy related greenhouse gases (such as landfill gas
capture). 20
The RGGI also provides for potential direct subsidies to non-
carbon-emitting sources in two ways. First, at least twenty-five per-
cent of the carbon dioxide allowances (or proceeds from their sale)
are to be dedicated to renewable energy, "non-emitting" electrical
energy sources, and conservation reductions at the discretion of the
states. 21 Since nuclear energy is a non-emitting energy source, par-
ticipating states may subsidize the nuclear industry with the proceeds
of the carbon allowances.22 Second, the RGGI leaves the method of
allocating carbon dioxide allowances up to the states. 23 Allocation
based on electrical generation capacity is permitted, which means
that in theory, existing nuclear power plants might receive carbon
allowance allocations, which they do not need, based on their gener-
ating capacity. 24 Proceeds from the sale of these allowances would
be a direct subsidy to nuclear generation. 25
In addition to these potential direct subsidies to nuclear power, a
carbon cap and trade scheme also provides other direct and indirect
subsidies to nuclear power. By raising the cost of competing fossil
fuel based power, nuclear generators enjoy a competitive price ad-
vantage and can raise their own prices. 6 Even more directly, be-
cause of the way that electrical generation capacity is allocated and
priced by the Independent Systems Operator for each state, any in-
20. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Memorandum of Understanding,
2.F(1) (Dec. 20,2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf
[hereinafter RGGI MOU].
2!. RGG! MOU, supra note 20, at 2G(I).
22. For this reason, the industry association Nuclear Energy Institute has ap-
plauded the RGGI agreement, specifically claiming that nuclear power will be
eligible for these "non-emitting" allowances. Press Release, Nuclear Energy Insti-
tute, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Carbon Dioxide Cap-and-Trade Program
Treats Nuclear and Renewables Equally, http://www.nei.org/index.asp?catnum=
2&catid=337 (last visited January 14,2007).
23. RGG! MOU, supra note 20, at 2G.
24. See id.
25. If nuclear power plants receive unneeded carbon allocations and sell them,
the proceeds from this sale would constitute additional revenue to nuclear power
plants, at the expense of carbon emitting fossil fueled plants; resulting in a subsidy
from the fossil fuel plants to the nuclear plants.
26. See Daniel N. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, The Commerce Clause, and
The Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow A Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44
EMORY L.J. 1227, n.20 (1995) (explaining how a cost increase to competitive
goods constitutes a subsidy).
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crease in the price for fossil fuel based electricity provided by the
lowest marginal cost supplier is automatically passed on to the nu-
clear generators, which are usually base-load generators. 27
These indirect subsidies to nuclear power might not be a bad thing,
if the only goal were to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The prob-
lem arises in that these subsidies seek to improve the internalization
of environmental costs in one market (carbon-based electrical gen-
eration) by creating market distortions in another market (non-
emitting electrical generation) that may also have its own environ-
mental externalities. The bottom line is that, whatever greenhouse
gas reducing benefits carbon trading achieves may come at the cost
of imposing additional environmental and economic externalities in
another sphere. It is worth examining those externalities, especially
the externalities of nuclear power generation, before uncritically em-
bracing a carbon trading scheme that subsidizes nuclear power gen-
eration. Unfortunately, nuclear power has its own set of externalities
that would be worsened by any subsidy built into a carbon trading
scheme.
II. WASTE EXTERNALITIES OF NUCLEAR POWER
A. Wastes Generated
Nuclear power generation uses fuel rods composed of Uranium
235 and Uranium 238. 28 The nuclear fission process generates heat,
27. As noted in the stakeholder workshop sessions predicate to the RGGI, the
value of carbon allowances necessary to produce the marginal-low cost energy
producer will be "bid in" by the utilities as part of their costs. REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE STAKEHOLDER GROUP MEETING PROCESS 27-29
(Sept. 21, 2005) (cost of allowances to be included in bid price), available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/fmal_summary_9_21_05.pdf.This carbon allowance
cost will thus be added to the price received by all generators dispatched on that
day, whether they use carbon allowances or not. See Peter Cramton, Report on
Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets on Behalf of
Duke Energy, San Diego Gas & Electric Company, FERC Docket No. ELOO-95-
075 (Mar. 20, 2003) (explaining how Independent System Operator single clearing
price bid systems operate to pay all suppliers the highest marginal price bid in for
electricity supply in the market), available at http://www.cramton.umd.edu
/papers2000-2004/cramton-bidding-behavior-in-electricity-markets.pdf.
28. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Introduc-
tion to Nuclear Power, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/intro.html (last
visited October 20, 2006).
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which is transferred from the reactor vessel to generate steam to run
turbines. 29 The fission process also creates radioactive byproducts
in the fuel rods. 3o After a period of time (about five years),3l the
fuel rods no longer generate enough heat for economical power gen-
eration, and must be removed and stored or disposed.
These "spent" fuel rods consist of 96% uranium and 4% other iso-
topes created by the fission process. 32 These isotopes include Ce-
sium 137, Iodine 129, Cesium 137, and Plutonium 239. 33 Some of
these isotopes have half lives running into the millions of years, such
as Iodine 129, which has a half life of 17 million years.34 Plutonium
239 has a half life of 24,360 years. 35 An isotope is not "safe" at the
end of its half life; rather, it has become half as dangerous, and after
another "half life" will become a quarter as dangerous. 36 These ra-
dioactive isotopes emit ionizing radiation. 37 In addition, the spent
fuel rods continue to generate heat for decades after removal from
the nuclear power plant, further complicating storage and disposal. 38
Dangerous human exposure can occur either by proximity to the
spent fuel or by release of constituents into the biosphere, resulting
in human exposure through ingestion or respiration, or by simple
29. Id.
30. Nat'l Research Council Comm. on the Safety and Security of Commercial
Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report (2005) [hereinafter, NRC Spent Fuel
Report].
31. !d. at 17-19.
32. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REpORT TO CONGRESS ON ADVANCED FUEL
CYCLE INITIATIVE: THE FUTURE PATH FOR ADVANCED SPENT FUEL TREATMENT
AND TRANSMUTATiON RESEARCH, 11-2 and Table II-I (2003), available at
http://www.ne.doe.gov/reports/AFCI_CongRpt2003.pdf
33. See COMM. ON TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN
STANDARDS, 18-19 (1995), available at http://newton.nap.edulbooks/0309052890/
htm1l2.html, [hereinafter NRC YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPORT].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. According the Encyclopedia Britannica, the "half life" of an unstable
atomic isotope is the ''time required for the number of disintegrations per second
of a radioactive material to decrease by one-half." Accordingly, after the half life
of a radioactive isotope, it will still be emitting radiation, but at one half its origi-
nal rate. After another half-life, the rate will be decreased to one half of one half,
or one quarter.
37. See U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Radiation Information: Ionizing Radiation
Fact Sheet Series: No.1, http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/ionize/402-f-98-
009.htm (last visited October 20,2006).
38. NRC Spent Fuel Report, supra note 30, at 17-18.
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proximity to places where these radionuclides collect. 39 Ionizing
radiation causes human health effects by attacking human cells.4o In
high doses, ionizing radiation will kill human cells, causing internal
organ failure and death.4I In low to moderate doses, ionizing radia-
tion causes cell mutation and disruption of DNA, which causes can-
cers, birth defects, and improper development.42
B. Current Disposition ofNuclear Waste
As of 2003, there were 50,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel in
the United States.43 The majority of this fuel is stored in spent fuel
pools at existing operating or decommissioned nuclear power
plants.44 The spent fuel pools hold the spent fuel rods under water.45
The water both carries off the continuing decay heat and shields
workers and the surrounding environment from escaping radiation.46
The spent fuel pools were originally designed to hold spent nuclear
fuel only until it cooled sufficientl,?; to tran~ort to a permanent dis-
posal site or reprocessing facility. 7 As n~ permanent disposal site
has opened and no commercial reprocessing industry was ever de-
veloped, the spent fuel pools have ended up storing on-site most of
the spent fuel generated during the entire history of nuclear power
generation.48 In order to make room for the extra fuel rods, nuclear
power plants have packed the spent fuel rods closer together than the
original design contemplated, increasing the risk of a fuel-heat in-
duced fire should the spent fuel pools lose their cooling water. 49
39. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, AN EVALUATION OF RADIATION EXPOSURE
GUIDANCE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS: INTERIM REpORT, 13-14 (1997) available
at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/5853.html#toc.
40. NRC YUCCA MOUNTAIN REpORT, supra note 33, at 34-36.
41. Id at 34-39.
42. Id
43. NRC Spent Fuel Report, supra note 30, at 20.
44. Id at 20.
45. Id at 19-20.
46. !d. at 38.
47. Id at 21.
48. Id. at 20.
49. Id at 23. These spent fuel pools are thus a likely terrorist target, as loss of
cooling water can lead to a thennal reaction with the zirconium fuel cladding to
generate hydrogen and a fire, dispersing the spent fuel inventory into the environ-
ment. Id at 38-39. The spent fuel at one plant could render thousands of square
miles uninhabitable.
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As the spent fuel pools become full at the higher density configura-
tion, power plant owners have begun to move the older (and cooler)
spent fuel rods out of the spent fuel pool and into "dry cask" stor-
age. 50 These dry cask storage containers consist of concrete and
steel cylinders, which are vented to allow continued air-cooling of
the decay heat still produced by radioactive isotopes. 51 Currently,
about 6,200 metric tons of spent fuel is stored in these dry casks,
mostly located at the sites that generated them. 52 The proportion of
spent fuel stored in dry casks is likely to increase, as spent fuel pools
are filled to capacity and new spent fuel is generated at the rate of
2,000 metric tons per year in this country. 53 These dry cask storage
units are only required to have a design life of twenty years. 54
Dry cask storage represents a sort of limbo for spent nuclear fuel.
Unless the United States develops and opens a long term repository
with sufficient capacity to accept the volume of waste generated, or
develops commercial fuel reprocessing capacity, the spent fuel pools
and dry cask storage facilities are likely to be the ultimate disposal
sites for nuclear power generation wastes in this country.55 As dis-
cussed below, neither of these alternative disposal systems is likely
to be developed adequately, so dry cask storage at the generation
sites is the most likely outcome. The generation sites are located
throughout the United States, and many are located in coastal and in
metropolitan areas.
C. The Unlikely Alternative Disposal Methods
The current dry-cask limbo for spent nuclear fuel was not planned.
At the outset of commercial nuclear energy generation, the assump-
tion was that spent fuel would be sent to a reprocessing facility and
50. NRC Spent Fuel Report, supra note 30, at 23.
51. Id. at 61.
52. Id. at 20.
53. Id.
54. 10 C.F.R. § 72.236(g) (2000); see also U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM'N, STANDARD REVIEW PLAN FOR DRY CASK STORAGE SYSTEMS, FINAL
REpORT (1997), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-nn/doc-collections/
nuregs/ staff/srl536/.
55. This conclusion follows logically from the fact that four decades after
commencement of commercial nuclear generation, nearly all the wastes generated
by the nuclear industry remain at the original temporary storage facilities; the fuel
pools. As the NRC Spent Fuel Report itself concludes, "Thus, onsite storage of
spent fuel is likely to continue for at least several decades." NRC Spent Fuel Re-
port, supra note 30, at 23.
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reused after a sufficient cooling off period in the power plant spent
fuel pool. 56 When commercial reprocessing of fuel proved unsafe
and economically nonviable the government and the nuclear industry
focused on deep geological burial as the appropriate means to dis-
card of spent nuclear fuel. 57 The political impossibility of siting
adequate disposal facilities has now led thegendulum to swing back
towards reprocessing as a possible solution.
Unfortunately, neither deep geological burial nor reprocessing ap-
pear to be likely solutions to the waste disposal problems, and both
pose serious risks. In the meantime, the spent fuels continue to pile
up at nuclear generation sites. 59
1. Yucca Mountain Deep Geological Repository
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 198260 (NWPA) directed the
Department of Energy (DOE) to develop, construct, and operate a
deep burial geological waste repository for high-level civilian and
military nuclear wastes. In 1987, Congress amended the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act to direct the DOE to focus on one site: Yucca
Mountain in the Nevada desert.61 Following a lengthy evaluation
process, in 2002 the DOE recommended the Yucca Mountain site to
the President for approval, the President approved the recommenda-
tion, and, pursuant to the NWPA, Congress enacted a joint resolution
approving the site. 62
A complete discussion of the pros and cons of Yucca Mountain as
a. nuclear waste disposal site is beyond the scope of this essay.
However, it is a classic understatement to say that the Yucca Moun-
tain waste disposal site remains controversial, particularly within
Nevada. Despite a statutory mandate requiring the facility to open
by 1998, the DOE has yet to receive a license for the facility or to
56. NRC Spent Fuel Report, supra note 30, at 21, 100-101.
57. Id.; NRC YUCCA MOUNTAIN REpORT, supra note 33, at 15-16.
58. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
59. NRC Spent Fuel Report, supra note 30 at 20-23.
60. 42 U.S.C. § § 10101-10270 (2000).
61. Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101
Stat. 1330-227 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101 - 10270 (1994)).
62. See Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
10135 note (Supp. IV 2004)). For a more complete discussion of the statutory and
regulatory history of the Yucca Mountain designation process, see generally Nu-
clear Energy Inst., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1260-1261
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
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start construction.63 In 2004, the D.C. Circuit undercut the entire
regulatory basis underlying the licensing procedure when it struck
down regulations adopted by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) establishing criteria for public exposure from the Yucca
Mountain nuclear waste repository.64 The court held that the EPA
regulations failed to comply with the mandates of the NWPA be-
cause the EPA limited its consideration of exposure pathways to a
period of 10,000 years following disposal, while the time of peak
risk for release of radionuclides to the environment was on the order
of hundreds of thousands to millions of years, after presumed disin-
tegration of disposal casks.65 This 10,000 year limit was directly
contrary to the recommendation of the National Research Council of
the National Academy of Sciences, which pointed out that the peak
risk of release would come after 10,000 years, and that geologic
processes at the site could be predicted over a million year time-
frame. 66
Like the spent nuclear fuel it is supposed to dispose of, Yucca
Mountain remains in limbo. As recently as February 2006, the En-
ergy Secretary was quoted as saying that the DOE could not predict
a date for the opening of the Yucca Mountain waste repository.67
Nevertheless, the question of whether, when, and should Yucca
Mountain open as a high-level nuclear waste repository is somewhat
academic to the question of long term disposal of the wastes from
ongoing nuclear energy production. Yucca Mountain is even more
irrelevant to the question of disposal of wastes generated by in-
creased nuclear generation capacity constructed as a means to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. This is because, as designed, Yucca
Mountain will barely have the capacity to accept all of the civilian
nuclear waste that has already been generated and is sitting in limbo
at nuclear power plant sites and it has no reserve capacity.68 The
statutory capacity of Yucca Mountain is 70,000 metric tons of high
level nuclear waste.69 Ten percent of this capacity is reserved for
63. Matthew L. Wald, Big Question Marks on Nuclear Waste Facility, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14,2006, at C4.
64. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d l25l(D.C.
Cir. 2004)(per curiam).
65. Id. at 1266-1274
66. NRC YUCCA MOUNTAIN REpORT, supra note 33.
67. Wald, supra note 63, at C4.
68. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(d) (2006).
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military nuclear wastes, leaving 63,000 metric tons of capacity. 70 As
of 2003, there were already 50,000 metric tons of civilian nuclear
waste in this country awaiting a disposal site, and we are generating
an additional 2,000 metric tons per year. 71 At that rate, the entire
capacity of Yucca Mountain would be used by the year 2009 - be-
fore any possible opening date of the facility. 72
Yucca Mountain was undoubtedly selected as a disposal site both
for its geologic stability and its location in a sparsely populated state
with less political power. 73 Even so, Yucca Mountain has proven to
be a political nightmare. Finding and approving a second site in a
more populous state would seem to be impossible as long as our po-
litical system survives. Given our inability as a nation to establish
an adequately sized nuclear waste repository during the first fifty
years of nuclear power generation, there is no reason to expect us to
site, design, and construct a second such facility.
2. Reprocessing
Spent nuclear power plant fuel consists of 96% uranium and 4%
plutonium and other long-lived radionuclides. 74 In theory, if the
uranium could be separated from the plutonium and purified, it could
be reused as reactor fuel, as could plutonium. 7s This is the theory
behind nuclear fuel reprocessing.
Reprocessing poses its own set of political and moral risks. Pluto-
nium is much more highly radioactive and poisonous than ura-
nium. 76 Plutonium is also the ideal fuel for atomic bomb construc-
tion; just a few pounds of it in the wrong hands would allow the con-
70. See Dep't of Energy, Supplement to the Final Envtl. Impact Statement for
a Geological Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level
Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, NV, 71 FED. REG. 60490-01
n.5 (October 13, 2006).
71. NRC Spent Fuel Report, supra note 30, at 20.
72. Id. The last scheduled opening date for Yucca Mountain was 2010, before
the court setback. Id. at 23.
73. See Lizette Alvarez, Senate and Clinton Still Stalled on Nuclear Waste
Disposal, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,2000, at A16.
74. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 32, at 11-2.
75. Id. , passim; NRC Spent Fuel Report, supra note 30 at 100.
76. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 32, at 1-1; U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
REpORT TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PLUTONIUM NEEDS, COSTS, AND MANAGEMENT
PROGRAMS, 4 (1997) available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/rc97098.pdf.
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struction of a crude atomic weapon. 77 This weapons proliferation
risk led President Jimmy Carter to ban the reprocessing of spent nu-
clear fuel into plutonium in 1977.78
Nuclear fuel reprocessing has had a checkered history in the
United States. One commercial fuel reprocessing facility was con-
structed in West Valley, New York by Getty Oil Company.79 This
facility never achieved profitability and left behind a one billion dol-
lar cleanup bill, borne by the public, after it closed.80 Although nu-
clear fuel containing plutonium can theoretically be burned in exist-
ing commercial reactors, their owners have been extremely reluctant
to accept the highly radioactive fuel. 81
Nevertheless, faced with a Yucca Mountain repository that is al-
ready booked solid with the last forty years of nuclear waste, an
Administration that supports nuclear power is taking a new look at
fuel reprocessing as a way to increase the disposal capacity of Yucca
Mountain while promoting new nuclear reactors. The DOE issued a
report to Congress recommending the development of new reproc-
essing technologies that would generate uranium that is sufficiently
pure for re-use in nuclear generating facilities, while also leaving the
plutonium bound up with even more hazardous radionuclides that
would make the plutonium unattractive to bomb-makers.82 The re-
duction in volume of the wastes to be disposed would extend the life
of the Yucca Mountain waste repository. 83 The plutonium fuel
would run through a new generation of "fast" electron reactors,
which would destroy the plutonium and other dangerous radionu-
clides while generating heat for electricitY generation.84
Congress has obliged the DOE proposal by providing $50 million
for research and development of these reprocessing technologies.
Nevertheless, experts on nuclear waste reprocessing remain skepti-
cal. Success for this reprocessing proposal would require the siting
and construction of a series of reprocessing facilities and nearby
77. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Security: Nuclear Terrorism
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism/ (last visited October 20,
2006).
78. Statement by the President on His Decisions Following a Review of U.S.
Policy, 1977 Pub. Papers 587-88.
79. Wald, supra note 63 at F3.
80. Id.
8!. See id.
82. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 32.
83. Id. at I-I; 11-1-4.
84. Id.
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dedicated nuclear power plants.85 The new power plants would have
to be near to the reprocessing facilities because the plutonium fuel
would be so dangerous that it could not safely be transported. 86 Sit-
ing such facilities is likely to be a political impossibility.87
Meanwhile, the waste generated by existing nuclear power plants
continues to pile up, and will slowly be moved into onsite dry-cask
storage containers with a design life span of twenty years. 88
D. Extreme Long Term Fate ofNuclear Wastes: Predicting Eco-
nomic, Political, and Climate Systems in Geological Time
It goes without saying that piling hazardous nuclear wastes, with
half lives running into millions of years, into casks designed to last
decades at most, is a recipe for disaster. The fact is that no political
or economic system can assure the security or integrity of waste for a
period of time even remotely approaching the time period during
which such waste poses extreme health, environmental, and nuclear
proliferation risks.
To put the 24,000 year half life of plutonium in context, keep in
mind that recorded human history has lasted for only 5,000 years.
Thirty-thousand years ago, Neanderthals still populated the Euro-
pean continent. In that time period, the continental glaciers of the
Wisconsin age had advanced and retreated. 89 No political system or
civilization has lasted through even a remotely comparable time
frame: the Chinese civilization (generally considered among the
world's oldest extant) has been in existence a mere 10,000 years.
The Roman Empire lasted a mere 1,500 years.
If the past is any prediction of the future, the nuclear wastes we are
now taking from storage pools and placing in casks will outlast our
political system. These current (and likely permanent) disposalloca-
tions are located primarily at the sites of the nuclear power plants
that have generated these wastes.90 Many of these power plants are
located near major metropolitan areas: over 161 million people cur-
85. Wald, supra note 63, at F3.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
89. See John S. Schlee, United States Geological Survey, Our Changing Con-
tinent (2000), http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/continents/ (map showing extent of Wis-
consin glaciation 18,000 years ago).
90. For a map of the current locations of spent fuel storage in the United
States, see NRC Spent Fuel Report, supra note 30, at 21.
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rently live within seventy-five miles of a nuclear power plant,91
Each spent fuel inventory contains enough radionuclides, if widely
dispersed, to render thousands of square miles uninhabitable.92
Given the time periods involved, release of these radionuclides
into the environment becomes an eventual near certainty. No politi-
cal system will last forever. The civil strife following the eventual
collapse of the United States' political system (to say nothing of the
other nuclear power generating nations of the world) will leave these
radioactive inventories open to potential diversion by terrorists and
warring civil factions. 93 It is not credible to assert that some future
political system will, at great expense, take responsible care of the
wastes we generate now when we are unable and unwilling to take
care of these wastes at the richest time in the history of the richest
nation on earth.94
- And even if these casks are left undisturbed by political strife, en-
vironmental factors will claim them eventually. Many of these
waste repositories are located in coastal areas subject to rises in
global sea levels. 95 Many of these waste repositories are also lo-
cated in areas covered by continental glaciers in the last glacial pe-
91. U.S. Dept't of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., Fact
Sheet: What Are Spent Nuclear Fuel And High-Level Radio Active Waist? (2004),
http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/factsheets/doeymp0338.shtml.
92. Dr. Gordon Thompson has calculated that the spent fuel pool inventory at
the Indian Point nuclear power plant has sufficient radioactivity to render an area
of 95,000 square kilometers uninhabitable. This constitutes 75% of the land area
ofNew York State. Declaration of7 December 2001 by Dr. Gordon Thompson in
Support of Petition of Riverkeeper, Inc., Power Auth. Of the State of NY (Nuclear
Power Plant and Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-01-14, 53 N.R.C. 488 (2001) available
at http://riverkeeper.orgldocument.php/41/Thompson_Declar.doc.
93. In his book Collapse, Jared Diamond recounts the history of several civili-
zations that have collapsed due to inability to cope with environmental change,
including human wrought environmental changes. One common theme in such
societal collapses is a period of civil strife and violence as the society rejects the
political systems that lead to the environmental stresses. JARED DIAMOND,
COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005).
94. As noted in the COMM. ON TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN
STANDARDS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNICAL BASIS FOR YUCCA
MOUNTAIN STANDARD 55 (1995), some in the nuclear industry have advocated
leaving the spent fuel at the generation sites where, it is assumed, it can be moni-
tored and disposed of properly in the future.
95. See NRC Spent Fuel Report, supra note 30, at 21, Figure 1.3 (map show-
ing location of dry cask fuel storage facilities).
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riod, which ended around eighteen thousand years ago. 96 Either
eventuality would be sufficient to cause widespread dispersal of the
radioactive inventories of these nuclear wastes, rendering thousands
of square miles uninhabitable. And given the vast time periods in-
volved - up to millions of years for some radionuclides - both global
warming and global cooling are possible before these wastes have
naturally decayed to the point where they no longer pose a threat. 97
III. THE RISK EXTERNALITIES OF NUCLEAR POWER
The economic costs and environmental hazards of disposal of
spent nuclear fuel remain the largest unresolved obstacles to expan-
sion of nuclear power as a way of reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions. But nuclear power generation poses other environmental and
economic externalities as well. The current regulatory scheme gov-
erning nuclear energy in this country fails to take these externalities
into account as either a regulatory or an economic matter.
A. Accident Risks
Every operating nuclear power plant poses some risk of a severe
accident, including an uncontrolled nuclear reaction that leads to
core meltdown and potentially huge releases of radioactivity into the
environment. The nuclear industry estimates the chances of a severe
reactor accident to be about one out of every 10,000 reactor years of
operation.98 While this may sound like a small risk, it means that
with 100 operating nuclear power plants in the United States, we can
expect one severe accident every 100 years. If these 100 plants keep
operating indefinitely into the future, or are replaced in kind to miti-
gate global carbon emissions, a severe reactor accident is virtually
certain in this country in the future.
Moreover, if we were to construct the 200 additional nuclear
power plants in this country necessary to meet the Phase I carbon
96. For a map showing the extent of continental glaciers in North America
during the last glacial period, see Schlee, supra note 89.
97. As noted, the 24,000 year half life of plutonium exceeds the time since the
last major glaciation of North America, during the Wisconsin period. See supra
note 96 and accompanying text.
98. MARK HOLT & CARL E. BEHRENS, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS:
NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY CRS-I (June 4, 2003), available at http://usinfo.
state.gov/usa/infousa/tech/energy/nuclear.pdf.
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reductions contemplated by the Kyoto Protocol,99 that same one-in-
ten thousand chance of a severe reactor accident would turn into an
expectation of one severe reactor accident every thirty years. Com-
bined with all the other nuclear reactors around the world - and as-
suming that all such reactors are at least as safe and well operated as
those in the United States - severe nuclear reactor accidents would
be expected to occur ever few years.
The consequences of a severe nuclear reactor accident can be hard
to predict. However, using the most recent models and making op-
timistic assumptions about the success of evacuation efforts and
evacuation travel times, the Riverkeeper organization has estimated
that a reactor meltdown at one of the Indian Point nuclear power
units fifty miles north of New York City would result in as many as
44,000 short term fatalities from radiation exposure, 518,000 latent
cancer fatalities, $2 trillion in property damage, and the relocation of
eleven million people. IOO The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
1982 report estimates the consequences of a severe reactor accident
at Indian Point as 46,000 Peak Early Fatalities, 141,000 Peak Early
Injuries, and 13,000 Peak Deaths from cancer, along with $274 bil-
lion (1982 dollars) in property damage. 101
These risks are borne by the exposed population, not by the nu-
clear generation industry. Under the Price-Anderson Act, the liabil-
ity of the nuclear industry as a whole is limited to approximately $10
billion. l02 This exemption from the costs for ensuring against these
risks constitutes a huge additional subsidy to the nuclear generation
industry, amounting, by some estimates, to as much as thirty cents
per kilowatt hour of electricity generated. 103
99. Phillip Ward, Nuclear Power: No Solution to Climate Change, NUCLEAR
MONITOR, 9-10 (2005) available at http://www.nirs.orglmononline/nukesclimate-
changereport.pdf.
100. Edwin S. Lyman, Chernobylon the Hudson? The Health and Economic
Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plan,
RIVERKEEPER, INC. (2004) available at http://riverkeeper.orgldocument.php/3l7/
Chemobyl_on_th.pdf.
101. Sandia Labs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Calculation of Reactor
Accident Consequences (1982) (commonly referred to as the "CRAC-2 Report"),
http://www.mothersalert.orglcrac.html.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 221O(e) (2005); see U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Fact
Sheet on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief Funds, available at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds.pdf (last visited
Jan. 15, 2007).
103. Anthony Hayes, Determining the Price of Price-Anderson Regulation,
REGULATION (2003), available at http://www.cato.orglpubs/regulation/regv25n4/
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B. Terrorism Risks
The one-in-ten-thousand-reactor-years estimate of operating reac-
tor risk is an estimate of risk based on the normal operation of a nu-
clear reactor. 104 These estimates simply do not take into account the
risk of intentional sabotage causing radioactive dispersal. In the
wake of the September 11th attacks, the National Research Council
performed an assessment of the chances of a terrorist attack on a
nuclear facility in the United States, and concluded that "the poten-
tial for a September 11 th-style surprise attack in the near term using
U.S. assets, such as airplanes, appears to be high." 105
These risks are not easily quantified, but must be at least as great -
or greater - than the risk of accidental reactor mishap. Shockingly,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) takes no account of
these terrorism risks whatsoever in licensing and regulatory deci-
sions affecting nuclear power generation. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission long ago adopted a policy that terrorism risks were too
uncertain to quantify, and thus could not be considered in assessing
the siting and Rotential impacts of nuclear generation and waste stor-
age facilities. 1 6 The NRC continues to adhere to this policy even in
the wake of the September 11 th attacks. 107
Like the risks associated with operational nuclear accidents, the
risks of sabotage have been shifted to the public at large by the
Price-Anderson ACt. 108 This risk-shifting constitutes an additional
externality of nuclear power generation.
v25n4-8.pdf.
104. See David Lochbaum, Nuclear Plant Risk Studies. Failing the Grade, 4-12
(2000) (discussing factors used by nuclear industry in risk analysis), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/nuc_risk.pdf.
105. Comm. on Science and Tech. for Countering Terrorism, Nat'l Research
Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role ofScience and Technology in Coun-
tering Terrorism, 50 (2002) available at http:// www.nap.edu/html/stct/index.html
106. See Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 869
F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1989); See also City of New York v. U. S. Dep't of Transp., 715
F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983); Final Rule, Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear Fuel
and High-Level Radioactive Waste, 63 Fed. Reg. 26955-01, 955-56 (May 15,
1998).
107. See In re Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., CLI-02-25, 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002);
see also In re Duke Energy Corp., CLI-02-26, 56 N.R.C. 358 (2002).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 221O(e) (2005).
HeinOnline -- 17 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 245 2005-2006
246 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVII
C. Proliferation Risks
As noted, spent nuclear fuel contains Plutonium 239. 109 Ifnuclear
fuel is recycled back into uranium, the plutonium must be separated
from the uranium. 110 Plutonium 239 is fissionable material for a
simple nuclear bomb, requiring only nine pounds. 111 Separating the
uranium from the plutonium is the most challenging technical aspect
of developing a nuclear weapon. 112 If more Plutonium 239 is made
available, the more source material for nuclear weapons will be at
risk of diversion. 113 In addition, the same technologies needed to
enrich uranium to the point where it is suitable for nuclear power
generation can be used to enrich uranium to the point where it is
suitable for bomb-making as well. 114
Like the risk of terrorism, this risk of proliferation is very difficult
to quantify, but in the long term can be assumed to reach a level of
probability. One consequence of increased nuclear power generation
worldwide would be the increased availability of nuclear weapons
and their likely use in an international conflict at some time in the
future.
IV. PRACTICALITIES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY PRODUCTION AS AN
OFFSET TO GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
In addition to the long-term environmental and economic external-
ities implicated by the by-products of nuclear power generation,
practical constraints all but preclude reliance on nuclear power as a
significant means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the time-
frame necessary to mitigate the global climate change impacts of
carbon-based energy production.
109. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
110. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 32.
111. Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Security: Nuclear Terrorism
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism! (last visited October 20,
2006).
112. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 32 at II-6 (difficulty of separating plu-
tonium from spent fuel).
113. See Nuclear Info. and Resource Service; Plutonium Proliferation and
MOX Fuel, http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/moxproliferation.htm
114. See Statement of Pierre Goldschmidt, Deputy Director of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, The Increasing Risk of Nuclear Proliferation: Addressing
the Challenge November 26,2003 (available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/
Statements/DDGs/2003/goldschmidt26112003.html ).
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First, the process of designing, siting, approving, and constructing
nuclear power plants takes too long to pennit expansion of nuclear
power on the scale that would be necessary.115 According to the
Nuclear Infonnation and Resource Service, up to 1,000 new reactors
would be needed in the United States alone to replace existing reac-
tors that are reaching the end of their useful life and expand nuclear
power generation to the level necessary to meet the Phase I green-
house gas reductions contemplated by the Kyoto accords. 116 Given
that no new nuclear plants have been built in the United States in the
last twenty years, it is unrealistic to expect that anywhere close to the
necessary expansion in nuclear energy generation could be achieved
by the Kyoto accord's 2012 Phase I deadline. I 17
Even if the plants could be built in time, there is not enough nu-
clear fuel economically available to run them all. According to the
Department of Energy, at current rates of consumption, demand will
exceed the readily available supplies and stockpiles of uranium fuel
by the year 2014. 118 According to the Nuclear Infonnation and Re-
source Service, if nuclear energy generation were expanded as nec-
essary to meet the Phase I reductions of the Kyoto accords, the exist-
ing fuel supply would be exhausted within three to four years. 119
Nuclear energy would be sustainable only if fuel reprocessing
could be perfected to the point where it is economical and safe from
proliferation risks. Nuclear energy advocates foresee a "closed fuel
115. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission currently requires an existing plant
to apply for a license renewal five years before expiration. See U.S Nuclear Regu-
latory Comm'n, Reactor License Renewal Process: Review Time,
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewaVprocess.htrnl#review-
time (last visited Jan. 17,2006). An application for a new plant can be expected to
take more time than a renewal.
116. Although the United States is not a signatory to the Kyoto accords, the
Phase 1 reductions imposed on the signatory states is a useful yardstick to measure
national compliance with carbon reduction goals. Under Phase 1 of the Kyoto
accord, signatory nations included in Annex 1 are to achieve a 5% reduction in
national greenhouse gas emissions, compared to 1990 levels, by the year 2012.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997,37 LL.M. 22, 33 available at http://UNFCCC.int/resource/docs/
onvkp/kpeng.pdf.
117. Based on the minimum five year renewal time frame required by the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission, application for a sufficient number of new plants
would have to be ready to file in 2007 in order to be granted by 2012; even with-
out leaving time for plant construction and testing.
118. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 32, at 1-5, figure 1-3.
119. Ward, supra note 99, at 11.
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cycle" where spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed into new nuclear fuel,
while the extremely poisonous radionuclides and weapons-grade
plutonium are magically transmuted into hannless elements. 120 This
particular form of alchemy remains just over the horizon for the nu-
clear industry, as it has throughout most of the history of nuclear
energy generation.
Given these impracticalities of large scale expansion of nuclear
generation capacity, one might ask where the hann lies in increased
nuclear generation to the extent possible, in at least partial mitigation
of greenhouse gas impacts. If worldwide nuclear generation capac-
ity is ultimately limited by the accessible uranium supply, then, one
could argue, the impacts of nuclear power will be self-limiting. Un-
fortunately, however, resources diverted into nuclear energy devel-
opment are taken away from other energy technologies more likely
to prove sustainable in the long tenn. 121 A widespread international
commitment to nuclear energy as a substantial means of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions will increase international pressure to en-
gage in high proliferation risk activities such as plutonium-
generating "breeder reactors.,,122 And even the short-tenn use of
nuclear power production continues to pile up spent fuel waste at
insecure sites throughout the world, where it will be vulnerable to
climate change impacts as well as the global social unrest that will
likely accompany such impacts. 123
V. INTERGENERATIONAL IMPACTS AND INTERCIVILIZATIONAL
IMPACTS: A COMPARISON OF GLOBAL WARMING EXTERNALITIES AND
NUCLEAR ENERGY EXTERNALITIES
The grave danger posed by nuclear energy is a function of the ex-
treme persistence of its wastes and by-products. 124 Catastrophic
120. See Matthew L. Wald, Scientists Try to Resolve Nuclear Problem With an
Old Technology Made New Again, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2005, at F3.
121. Ward, supra note 99, at 14.
122. See id. A "breeder reactor" generates heat for energy production while at
the same time converting more uranium to plutonium, which is then used to fuel
the reactor and generate more heat and more plutonium.
123. Social unrest often follows societal collapse resulting from environmental
and climate changes that defeat civilizations' ability to provide for basic human
necessities. See generally, DIAMOND, supra note 93.
124. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (half lives of radioactive
nuclear wastes extending into millions of years).
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events that may have a low probability in a given year, decade, or
century become near certainties when the time period is extended
into hundreds of thousands or millions of years. The chances of gla-
ciation or coastal flooding at waste storage sites (or both), or wide-
spread political disruption and civil unrest may seem remote at pre-
sent, but are near certainties in the tens of thousands of years before
the plutonium fraction of nuclear wastes we generate today has de-
cayed to the point that it is neither poisonous nor capable of annihi-
lating a city in the wrong hands. 125
These nuclear waste impacts seem as certain to occur as the im-
pacts anticipated from climate change. In order to assess the advis-
ability of increasing nuclear energy generation in an attempt to avoid
global climate change, it is worth comparing these impacts.
A. Timing
Scientific consensus holds that we are already feeling the effects of
global warming. 126 The more extreme effects of global climate
change are anticipated to occur within the next century. 127 Scientists
also believe that the earth will take centuries to absorb the excess
carbon dioxide currently produced by human activity.128 Of course,
if climate change reaches a "tipping point" through positive feed-
back mechanisms not yet fully understood, the impacts may last
much longer. 129 Climate change impacts are thus described as "int-
125. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Plutonium has a half life of
24,360 years. Global warming is already upon us; global sea level rise is expected
within the next century See supra note 95 and accompanying text. The last glacia-
tion occurred 18,000 years ago. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; see
also NRC YUCCA MOUNTAIN REpORT, supra note 33, at 91 (glacial period prob-
able within 10,000 years; several glacial/interglacial periods a near certainty over
one million years.). The longest lasting civilization in world history has lasted
only 10,000 years.
126. See generally, COMM. ON THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note
18.
127. See IPCC WORKING GROUP 1, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, 14 (2001) available at
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wgl/figspm-5.htm.
128. Id at 12, available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wgl/008.htm
#figspm5; COMMITTEE ON THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 18, at
tbl. 1.
129. See James E. Hansen, Presentation at SOLAR 2006 Conference on Re-
newable Energy (July 10, 2006) available at http://www.columbia.edu/-jehl/th
reat talk_complete_05Sept2006.pdf.
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ergenerational" - that is, future generations of the people now gener-
ating the carbon dioxide will suffer the greatest impacts. 130
By contrast, nuclear power generation waste impacts will last
many thousands of years, and even into the millions of years. 131 The
greatest impacts may not be felt for tens of thousands of years. 132
Given that no human civilization has lasted longer than 10,000 years,
at least some of the impacts of nuclear power will be imposed on
future peoples and political systems we cannot even contemplate.
Indeed, given the long persistence of these wastes even in compari-
son with the timeframe of human evolution, these impacts may even
be suffered by other species of humans yet to evolve. 133 The im-
pacts ofnuclear waste are thus "intercivilizational."
Either set of impacts seems palpably unfair. However, future gen-
erations may enjoy some of the vestigial advantages of the energy
wealth enjoyed by the unsustainable energy practices of the current
generation. It seems unlikely that future civilizations would enjoy
any such advantage. These intercivilizational impacts seem more
inequitable than the intergenerational impacts of climate change.
B. Location
The most severe impacts of global warming may not be suffered
by the biggest per capita generators of greenhouse gas emissions.
The United States has only five percent of the world's population,
yet contributes twenty percent of global greenhouse gas emis-
sions. 134 Over twenty-three million people in developing nations
such as India and Bangladesh live in coastal areas subject to flooding
due to global sea-level rise. 135 Changing rainfall patterns projected
130. See James C. Wood, Intergenerational Equity and Climate Change, 8
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 293 (1996).
131. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
132. See NRC YUCCA MOUNTAIN REpORT supra note 33, at 2 (peak risks likely
to occur tens to hundreds of thousands of years after disposal), 119 (peak risks
likely to occur after 10,000 years).
133. As one of the impacts of nuclear waste is its mutagenic properties, disper-
sal of nuclear waste might even hasten the evolution of new human species.
134. Union of Concerned Scientists, Renewable Energy: Mitigating Global
Warming, Feb. 3, 2006, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/clean_energyyo1
iciesIRES-climate-strategy.htm1 (last visited October 20, 2006).
135. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, VITAL CLIMATE
GRAPHICS - THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 33-34 (2001) available at
http://www.grida.no/climate/vita1l33.htm; http://www.grida.no/clmate/vita1l34a.h
tm.
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as a result of global warming are expected to reduce crop success in
sub-Saharan Africa, while some temperate zones of North America
and Russia may see possible increased crop yields due to a longer
growing season. 136 In sum, the foreseeable climate change impacts
will be imposed by carbon-producing developed nations on develop-
ing nations that have not contributed equally to the problem.
By contrast, in the case of nuclear energy wastes, the land we ren-
der uninhabitable may be our own. Radionuclides can certainly be
dispersed throughout the atmosphere in gaseous form or aerosol par-
ticles and throughout the oceans as particles suspended in liquid. 137
However, the greatest risk of sickness, death, and uninhabitability
lies in the geographic vicinity of the waste disposal sites. 138 And, of
course, the risks of nuclear proliferation might be felt anywhere, but
in the current geopolitical climate, they seem most likely to be suf-
fered by the nations that have developed and used nuclear power. 139
If it were merely a matter of imposing the risks on the political sys-
tem that received the benefits of the unsustainable energy system,
then nuclear power at least seems to impose its hazards more locally
and directly on its beneficiaries. The intercivilizational time frame
of these impacts overcomes this seeming fairness of nuclear energy
impacts: whatever human (or human-like) civilization occupies our
continent one hundred thousand years from now should no more
136. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REpORT (2001) available at
http://www.grida.no/c1imate/ipcc_tar/vo14/english/index.htm.; UNITED NAnONS
ENV'T PROGRAMME, GEO YEAR BOOK 2006, 60-66 (2006) available at
http://www.unep.org/geo/yearbook/yb2006/063.asp; Michael D. Mastrandrea &
Stephen H. Schneider, Global Warming, http://www.nasa.gov/worldbook
/global_warming_worldbook.html (last visited Jan. 17 2006).
137. For exposure pathways expected for long term storage of nuclear waste,
see NAS YUCCA MOUNTAIN REpORT, supra note 33, at 82.
138. Of course, nations may also export their nuclear waste impacts by export-
ing their nuclear wastes. See Patrick E. Tyler, Russia Sees Payoff in Storing Nu-
clear Wastes From Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,2001, at AI. But however
unfair this may seem to the people of the recipient country, it is at least a choice of
their national political system to accept such wastes. Conversely, the developing
nations most at risk for global warming impacts have made no such choice to be
subject to these impacts, and have received no compensation for it.
139. An assessment of the risk of nuclear conflict or terrorism in different re-
gions of the world is beyond the scope of this article. Recent acts of mass terror-
ism, such as the September 11 attacks, and the London and Madrid bombings,
have been primarily addressed towards the western developed nations that also
enjoy the benefits of nuclear power.
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equitably be subject to the environmental costs of our energy pro-
duction than the Bangladeshis.
C. Size ofPopulation Affected
Seventeen million Bangladeshis currently live in coastal regions
likely to become uninhabitable in the event ofwanning-induced sea-
level rise. 140 Six million inhabitants of the Nile Delta are at risk. 141
According to the National Academy of Sciences, "[a]s many as one
billion people, or 20 percent of the world's population, live on lands
likely to be inundated or dramatically changed by rising waters.,,142
It is hard to predict what proportion of these populations would die
as a result of massive climate-induced dislocations, whether through
flooding in stonns or famine and civil strife as a huge refugee popu-
lation tries to move into neighboring territories. Certainly, the casu-
alties would number in the millions. More deaths will result from
climate change-induced famine. According to a report of the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, forty nations with a
combined population of two billion people are at risk of drastically
increased undernourishment. 143
Fatalities ultimately due to nuclear generation impacts would also
be calamitous, but may be less calamitous. As discuss above, a sin-
gle nuclear accident in a populated region could be expected to cause
thousands of short tenn deaths, and tens of thousands of long tenn
deaths. Detonation of a single nuclear weapon in a city, by terror-
ists, could cause tens of thousands of deaths, and an all-out nuclear
war between two states could undoubtedly cause tens of millions of
fatalities. l44 Similarly, the number of people that could be displaced
140. United Nations Environmental Programme, supra note 125, at 33.
141. Id. at 34.
142. CHERYL SIMON SILVER & RUTH S. DEFRIES, ONE EARTH, ONE FUTURE:
OUR CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 92-93 (1992).
143. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Special Event on Im-
pact of Climate Change, Pests and Diseases on Food Security and Poverty Reduc-
tion, May 23 - 26, 2005, Background Document at 3 available at
http://www.fao.org/newsroom/common/ecg/102623/en/Climate_Change_Backgro
und_EN.pdf.
144. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Effects of a
Nuclear Explosion in a Populated Area: New York City, New York,
http://www.ippnw.orgINukeTerrorism04.html (calculating 60,000 fatalities from a
Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapon detonated in lower Manhattan); M.V. Ramana,
IPPNW Global Health Watch Report No.3, Bombing Bombay? Effects ofNuclear
Weapons and a Case Study ofa Hypothetical Explosion (1999) (concluding that a
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in the event of widespread dispersion of the radioactive nuclear in-
ventory of a single spent fuel pool numbers in the millions. 145
The long term human impacts of fossil fuel induced climate
change and nuclear waste are thus comparably horrific in scope.
Ultimately, the population affected by climate change may be sub-
stantially larger than the one affected by nuclear wastes. Nuclear
wastes, however, will affect populations much farther into the future
than the effects of global warming. 146
VI. CONCLUSION
Although nuclear energy is currently being promoted as part of the
solution to global climate change, nuclear energy production causes
environmental externalities on a scale equally horrific as those
caused by climate change from burning fossil fuels~ Nuclear
power's externalities are largely intra-national, and would be im-
posed by the developed nations of the world mainly on their own
territory, but are of such long duration that they are fairly character-
ized as intercivilizational. Fossil fuel climate impacts are more in-
ternational and global in scope, are intergenerational, and are im-
posed by the developed nations of the world on the developing na-
tions.
Any carbon regulation scheme that provides subsidies, whether di-
rect or indirect, to nuclear energy generation may increase the ulti-
mate scope of nuclear waste impact. Such schemes would not neces-
sarily achieve a sufficient reduction in greenhouse gas emissions to
counter global climate change. Throughout its history, the nuclear
egergy industry has deferred resolution of the most pressing problem
with its fuel cycle: disposal or reprocessing of its high-level radioac-
tive wastes. While new fuel reprocessing technologies may ulti-
mately hold promise for safer handling of nuclear fuel wastes, these
technologies cannot be developed in the timeframe necessary to al-
150 megaton nuclear weapon exploded over Bombay could cause as many as
8,000,000 fatalities) available at http://www.ippnw.org/bombay.pdf.
145. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. A consultant working for the
Riverkeeper organization has calculated that the radioactive inventory of the spent
fuel pool at Indian Point is sufficient to render three quarters of the land area of
New York State uninhabitable. Id.
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low nuclear energy to play a significant role in the urgent need to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
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